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Prenatal Diagnosis and Pre-implantation Genetic Diagnosis:  Legal and Ethical Issues 
By:  Roxanne Mykitiuk, Stephanie Turnham and Mireille Lacroix  
in Neil F. Sharpe and Ronald F. Carter (eds.) Genetic Testing: Care, Consent and 
Liability. Hoboken, New Jersey: JohnWiley and Sons Inc. (2006) 189-218. 
 
Introduction  
 
Prenatal diagnosis of genetic disorders and foetal anomalies has expanded significantly. 
Hundreds of conditions can be diagnosed through DNA analysis of foetal cells and 
ultrasound and maternal serum biochemical screening. The purpose of prenatal diagnosis 
is to rule out the presence in the foetus of a particular medical condition for which the 
pregnancy is at an increased risk. This information is provided to the individual or couple 
to assist in the decision-making process regarding the possible options including: 
carrying the pregnancy to term, preparing for a difficult delivery, preparing for the birth 
of a child with genetic anomalies and for special newborn care, or terminating the 
pregnancy. Preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) involves the creation of embryos 
outside the body and their subsequent biopsy, in order to test for a genetic disorder.  The 
stated advantage of PGD over prenatal diagnosis or testing is that the genetic diagnosis 
takes place at a much earlier stage.  As a pregnancy has not been established, couples or 
individuals will not have to consider abortion, which is likely to be a much more stressful 
and difficult decision than the disposal of affected embryos in their earliest stage of 
development.   It is expected that the range of conditions for which PGD is available will 
expand as the genes implicated are identified.  Prenatal genetic testing and 
preimplantation diagnosis raise a number of ethical and legal issues that will be discussed 
below following a brief description of PND and PGD techniques. 
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PND & PGD techniques 
 
Prenatal testing includes prenatal screening, prenatal diagnosis and preimplantation 
genetic diagnosis. Screening methods such as determination of maternal age, maternal 
serum screening and ultrasound are used to identify women who are at increased risk of 
having a child with a chromosomal anomaly or a congenital anomaly. If a screening test 
yields an abnormal result, it can be followed by prenatal diagnosis in order to establish 
whether the foetus does carry a specific genetic mutation or chromosomal anomaly. 
  
Prenatal diagnosis 
 
Techniques currently used for prenatal diagnosis include: 
• amniocentesis,  
• chorionic villus sampling (CVS) and  
• cordocentesis.  
Amniocentesis is performed after 14 weeks of gestational age (usually between 15 and 17 
weeks) in order to determine foetal karyotype and to detect the presence of molecular and 
biochemical abnormalities. A needle is inserted into the amniotic sac of a pregnant 
woman while ultrasound imaging is used to verify the position of the foetus and the 
location of the placenta. A small quantity of amniotic fluid is aspirated, and its level of 
alpha-fetoprotein is measured. The foetal cells contained in the amniotic fluid are also 
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cultured and analysed using karyotyping, molecular diagnosis, biochemical assays or 
direct fluorescent in situ hybridisation. Results are highly reliable, but are available one 
to three weeks after the amniocentesis, at 17 to 20 weeks of gestation. This is regarded by 
some as the most important drawback of amniocentesis: at this stage, termination of 
pregnancy – currently the only option to prevent the birth of an affected child – entails a 
greater physical and emotional risk to the woman than a first trimester abortion and is 
difficult to obtain in many regions of Canada and the United States [Childbirth by 
Choice, 2003; Henshaw & Finer, 2003].  However, the risks of the procedure itself are 
low. The risk of miscarriage due to amniocentesis is 0.5 to one percent, while the risk of 
infection and foetal injury are rare. Minor complications such as leakage of amniotic 
fluid, and bleeding occur in one to five percent of cases, but usually resolve themselves 
[Chodirker et al., 2001b; Jorde et al., 2003].  
 
CVS is performed earlier, between ten weeks and eleven weeks six days of gestational 
age. It involves the collection of chorionic tissue either through a transcervical or 
transabdominal technique, and its subsequent analysis. The cells obtained can be 
analysed directly or cultured as in amniocentesis. Like amniocentesis, CVS is highly 
accurate, but it has the advantage of yielding earlier results. The risk of spontaneous 
pregnancy loss is slightly higher at one to two percent over baseline risk for 
transabdominal tissue collection and three to six percent with the transcervical technique. 
CVS may also entail a one in 3000 risk of facial or limb anomaly due to vascular 
disruption. In addition, diagnosis may be compromised if the sample has been 
contaminated with maternal tissue or if there is a discrepancy between the chromosomes 
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in the foetal tissue and the chorionic tissue. These difficulties can however be easily 
circumvented [Chodirker et al., 2001b; Jorde et al., 2003].  
 
Cordocentesis is generally performed after 16 weeks of gestation when a rapid diagnosis 
is required in cases where ultrasound has revealed congenital malformations or growth 
retardation, to clarify suspected chromosome mosaicism, or to detect viral infections, 
haematological diseases, inborn errors of metabolism and maternal or foetal platelet 
disorders. It involves the insertion of a needle into the umbilical cord vessel with 
ultrasound guidance and the withdrawal of foetal blood. Cordocentesis has the advantage 
of allowing direct access to the foetus, but entails a slightly higher risk of pregnancy loss, 
as well as a five to ten percent risk of foetal distress [Chodirker et al., 2001b; Jorde et al., 
2003; Simpson and Elias, 2003].   
 
In addition to these techniques, prenatal genetic diagnosis can be conducted through 
foetal tissue sampling. As is the case in amniocentesis and cordocentesis, the procedure is 
performed under ultrasound guidance. A needle is inserted and foetal tissue such as skin, 
liver or foetal urinary tract is collected for analysis. The risks and complications are 
similar to those linked to cordocentesis. However, the procedure is not commonly 
practiced. Similarly, the isolation of foetal cells from maternal blood is currently being 
studied as a technique of prenatal diagnosis. It would have the advantage of  non-
invasiveness (and therefore extremely low risk) and of being conducted early in the first 
trimester. It is not yet available in clinical practice [Chodirker et al., 2001b; Health 
Canada, 2002; Jorde et al. 2003; Shinya et al., 2004].  
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Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis 
 
In contrast with prenatal diagnosis, preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) is conducted 
before a woman becomes clinically pregnant. It is therefore an attractive option for 
couples at increased risk of having a child with a genetic condition who wish to avoid the 
possible termination of an affected pregnancy or who oppose abortion for religious or 
moral reasons [Simpson and Elias, 2003; Sermon et al., 2004; Verlinsky et al., 2004]. 
Though it has moved from the research setting to clinical application in recent years, 
PGD is not widely available, and it is considerably more complex (and costly) than 
traditional PND methods [Health Canada, 2002; Simpson and Elias, 2003; Verlinsky et 
al., 2003]. It involves the creation of embryos through in vitro fertilisation and the 
analysis of only one or a few cells from these embryos (or, in some cases, from the 
ovum) in order to establish a genetic diagnosis.  
 
Cells can be obtained through biopsy at three different stages: prior to fertilisation 
(biopsy of polar bodies), from blastomeres, and from blastocysts. For polar-body biopsy, 
an incision is made in the zona pellucida in order to draw the polar body out of the egg. 
Analysis of the polar body enables scientists to draw conclusions about the genotype of 
the oocyte. The utility of this technique is limited to testing for aneuploidy or to cases in 
which risk is known to originate from the mother’s genotype since paternal mutations 
cannot be evaluated [Jorde et al., 2003]. In the case of blastomere biopsy, one or two cells 
are removed from the embryo three days after fertilisation, when the embryo is composed 
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of six to eight cells. A greater number of cells can be obtained for analysis through 
blastocyst biopsy. This strategy entails removing ten to thirty cells from the 
trophoectoderm rather than from the embryo itself. Biopsy is conducted five to six days 
after fertilisation, when the blastocyst contains over one hundred cells [Simpson and 
Elias, 2003; Sermon et al., 2004; Jorde et. al.].  
 
The cells thus obtained can be analysed through various methods. Polymerase chain 
reaction (PCR) is used to amplify the DNA from a single cell and diagnose monogenic 
disorders such as cystic fibrosis, sickle-cell anaemia, and Duchenne muscular dystrophy. 
Specific tests have been developed for approximately 40 monogenic disorders. Though 
all monogenic disorders could, in theory, be detected through PCR, the cost implications 
are such that tests exist only for the most common disorders [Sermon et al., 2004; Wells, 
23]. Fluorescence in-situ hybridisation (FISH) analysis can be used to detect embryo sex 
and chromosomal aberrations such as aneuploidy, translocations or other chromosomal 
rearrangements on selected chromosomes. A new technique called comparative genomic 
hybridisation (CGH) has also been developed to analyse the chromosomal complement of 
embryos. While FISH can only detect a limited number of chromosomes (between five 
and  nine per cell), comparative genomic hybridisation enables scientists to evaluate all 
chromosomes simultaneously. However, because it is a lengthy process, and because 
there is only a very short period of time during which PGD can be performed, CGH is not 
widely used [Sermon et al., 2004; Simpson et al., 2003; Wells, 2003]. Once cell analysis 
is completed, embryos that are free from the mutations or chromosomal aberrations tested 
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for are implanted into the woman’s uterus. In the case of polar body diagnosis, the 
selected ova are fertilised and then implanted.  
 
The use of PGD can improve the outcome of a pregnancy for a couple who use in vitro 
fertilisation in order to conceive and for those who are at increased risk of transmitting a 
genetic disorder to their offspring [Verlinsky et al., 2004]. However, it does not guarantee 
the birth of a healthy child. Available data from 2001 shows that following PGD, 
pregnancies were established in 16 to 24 percent of treatment cycles [European Society 
of Human Reproduction and Embryology, 2002; International Working Group on 
Preimplantation Genetics, 2001] and that a small percentage of the children born as a 
result of these pregnancies had some form of anomaly [International Working Group on 
Preimplantation Genetics, 2001]. There is a slight risk of misdiagnosis in PGD, often due 
to allelic dropout (a problem associated with PCR amplification failures) or DNA 
contamination. However, techniques such as multiplex-PCR and amplification of 
hypervariable fragments of DNA can lower risks of misdiagnosis [Jorde et al., 2003; 
Sermon et al., 2004; Wells, 2003]. Though PGD is considered a safe procedure, it 
remains “costly and technically challenging” [Jorde et al., 2003].  
 
Access to PND and PGD 
 
Prenatal genetic testing is not universally accessible. Many factors affect a pregnant 
woman’s ability to access these services, including economics and clinical risk factors.  
Develop intro here 
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Evidence-Based Access: Standards of Usefulness 
 
Whether or not a woman or couple is offered prenatal testing can depend on whether the 
health provider believes she meets the relevant risk threshold. Evaluating the clinical 
necessity of intervention is generally considered an appropriate strategy for allocating 
scarce medical resources [AMA Code of Ethics, s.E-2.03]. It is also a way to avoid 
unnecessary invasive tests. Concerns have been raised about recent direct-to-consumer 
marketing approaches which may cause increased demand on the part of consumers and 
lead to indiscriminate offers of testing without an appropriate risk assessment [Andrews 
and Zuiker, 2003; Holtzman and Watson, 1997]. On the other hand, it has recently been 
argued that the evidence to support the cost utility analysis of the risk thresholds is 
deficient, and that such thresholds can threaten autonomous choice; accordingly, it is 
argued that all pregnant women should be offered prenatal testing regardless of risk 
[Harris et al., 2004]. In any event, risk thresholds remain an important determining factor 
in access to prenatal testing, and a number of organizations have issued guidelines to 
assist health care professionals and geneticists in assessing the risk factors. Some risk 
factors can be identified by asking the right questions, including questions about maternal 
age, family history of genetic disorders, previous children, ethnic background, and 
medical and obstetric history [Roop, 2000; SOGC, 1998]. Another way to screen for risk 
factors is through medical examination, including maternal serum screening and 
ultrasound. In practice, these various methods are often combined into an overall risk 
assessment. Evidence-based standards of access arise in the initial screen stage.  
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Screening cannot detect the presence of a disorder; it only identifies women who are at 
increased risk of having a child with a genetic anomaly.  
 
 Practice Guidelines 
Ethnicity. Certain ethic backgrounds are associated with an increased risk of genetic 
disorder. For example, Tay-Sachs disease has been linked to Ashkenazi Jews and French 
Canadians in Eastern Quebec; and individuals of other than northern European descent 
are considered at high risk for thalassemia. It is generally recommended that genetic 
screening be uniformly offered to patients with high risk ethnic backgrounds [SOGC, 
1998; AMA Code of Ethics, s.E-2.137]. 
 
With respect to CF in particular, a National Institutes of Health (NIH) Consensus Panel 
originally issued a statement supporting access to CF testing for all pregnant couples, 
especially those in high risk populations [NIH, 1997]. Following this, a Steering 
Committee representing the interests of ACOG, ACMG and NHGRI was established to 
refine the recommendations, leading to creation of general guidelines [Grody et al., 
2001], laboratory standards [Richards et al., 2002], and patient education materials 
[ACOG, 2001a; ACOG, 2001b]. Overall, the materials recommend offering CF testing to 
couples in high risk ethnic groups who are pregnant or planning pregnancy, and making it 
available along with information about its limitations to couples in other ethnic groups 
with lower risk.  Given that knowledge of one’s carrier status can have implications for 
family planning [Lafayette et al., 1999], it is recommended that members of high risk 
ethnic groups be tested for carrier status prior to conception, to allow for genetic 
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counselling at an early stage [Grody et al., 2001; Chodirker et al., 2001a]. According to 
Canadian guidelines, it is preferable for both partners to be tested, but knowledge that the 
woman is a carrier can still be an indication for prenatal diagnosis [Chodirker et al., 
2001a]. 
 
Family History. It is widely agreed that a recurring genetic disorder in a family’s history 
is “a reasonable indication of risk” [Roop, 2000; Holtzman and Watson, 1997]. 
According to the AMA Code of Ethics, “prenatal genetic testing is most appropriate for 
women or couples whose medical histories or family backgrounds indicate an elevated 
risk of fetal genetic disorders” [AMA Code of Ethics, s.E-2.12]. Physicians should 
therefore take a full family history, which includes inquiries about siblings, parents, 
parents’ siblings, grandparents, and other extended family members where appropriate. 
However, family history does have limitations, particularly with respect to reliability and 
the different modes of inheritance [Holtzman and Watson, 1997]. Canadian practice 
guidelines appear to envision a spectrum, ranging from cases where prenatal testing must 
be offered (for example, where the woman is a carrier for Down syndrome) to cases 
where further information or consultation with the patient is required (for example, where 
one relative is found to have Down syndrome) [Chodirker et al., 2001a].  
 
Pregnancy History. Relevant pregnancy history factors include having a previous 
stillborn birth or a liveborn infant with a chromosomal anomaly. Invasive prenatal testing 
should always be offered in these cases because there is an increased risk of recurrence. 
Even when the prior infant had a de novo anomaly (i.e. where the parents have normal 
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karyotypes), prenatal testing is offered because of the potential for parental germline 
mosaicism [Chodirker et al., 2001a]. Previous environmental exposure can also be 
relevant [Holtzman and Watson, 1997].  
 
Maternal Age. It is traditionally recommended that all women over the age of 35 be 
offered prenatal testing, given the increased risk of fetal aneuploidy [ACOG, 2001]. 
However, the particular age cut-off has been described as “somewhat arbitrary,” and the 
best practice may be to look at all the factors surrounding a woman’s pregnancy [Roop, 
2000]. Canadian practice guidelines note that maternal age alone is a relatively poor 
predictor of fetal anomaly, and it may be inappropriate to rely on it when facilities exist 
for additional screening methods [Chodirker et al., 2001a]. Notably, there is a trend 
towards women extending their childbearing years, which means that invasive testing 
would be offered to an increasing number of women, with questionable utility, in the 
absence of further risk refinement. A recent study found that there was a reduction in the 
number of women electing to have invasive testing despite the rising maternal age, and 
the researchers attributed this to a departure from using maternal age alone as a risk 
assessment tool.  
 
Advanced paternal age is also associated with an increased risk of genetic anomalies. A 
frequently used cut-off is 40 years of age at the time of conception, but the ACMG 
recognizes that risk increases linearly with age. Advanced paternal age is associated with 
a wide variety of genetic disorders, many of which cannot be detected by ultrasound. 
Therefore, the ACMG recommends genetic counseling be tailored to the individual needs 
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of couples [ACMG, 1996].   
 
Ultrasound Examination and Biochemical Markers (Maternal Serum Screening).  Genetic 
assessment is recommended when an ultrasound scan reveals major fetal anomalies. 
There are also several minor fetal anomalies, or “soft signs,” that are statistically linked 
to chromosomal anomalies, but there is controversy about whether these soft signs have 
enough positive predictive value to warrant genetic testing. [Chodirker et al., 2001a].  
 
The maternal age risk factor for Down syndrome can be refined through the use of 
maternal serum screening for biochemical markers in the first or second trimester. The 
ACMG recommends that women who screen positive for trisomy 21 or 18 be offered 
genetic counselling and amniocentesis [Driscoll, 2004]. The ACMG also recommends 
that women be offered maternal serum screening to identify pregnancies at risk of neural 
tube defects and anencephaly. In these cases, the risk assessment is refined by factors 
such as maternal weight, race, and family history, and an elevated result is an indication 
for genetic counseling and additional testing [Driscoll, 2004]. There are numerous 
combinations of markers, and second trimester screening through the “triple test” or 
“quad screen” has been found particularly useful in detecting Down syndrome and 
trisomy 18 [Javitt, 2004]. First trimester screening methods use a combination of serum 
screening and ultrasound nuchal fold translucency screening. These methods have 
comparable detection rates of second-trimester screens and offer the advantage of an 
earlier test, but should not be offered routinely unless there is sufficient ultrasound 
training and quality control [Driscoll, 2004; Dolan, 2004]. Recent studies have found that 
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“fully integrated screening,” which combines first and second trimester screening 
methods with risk assessment from maternal age, outperforms second trimester screening 
alone [Dolan, 2004]. The extent to which these methods are routinely offered will depend 
on many policy issues. While they offer a superior risk assessment than maternal age 
alone, there is a concern that some women may rely too heavily on the screen result at the 
expense of seeking a further diagnostic test. It is also relevant to consider whether a 
woman who screens positive will be able to access first-trimester diagnostic testing 
[Javitt, 2004].  
 
Other Medical Factors. Given the variety of genetic disorders that can be detected 
prenatally, there are other indications of risk that go beyond the scope of this chapter. 
Health care providers should consult the guidelines and other medical literature for 
further information. For example, the ACMG has released a number of guidelines with 
respect to specific disorders, such as Fragile-X [Maddalena et al., 2001], uniparental 
disomy [Shaffer at al., 2001], and Prader-Willi and Angelman syndromes [ASHG and 
ACMG, 1996]. There are also clinical practice guidelines for specific testing techniques, 
such as FISH [Watson et al., 2000].  
 
 Obligations of the Health Care Provider 
The clinical guidelines are significant for healthcare providers because they provide a 
baseline standard of care for offering access to prenatal testing services. Physicians are 
under both a legal and ethical obligation to ensure that patients have access to necessary 
or beneficial services. It is therefore necessary for healthcare providers to be aware of the 
 14 
clinical indications, to identify them in patients, and to discuss the potential implications 
with the patient. Under ethical guidelines, physicians are required to discuss prenatal 
testing with “all women who have appropriate indications” [SOGC, 1998]. The AMA 
Code of Ethics also notes that women or couples who do not meet the risk threshold may 
request prenatal diagnosis as long as they are aware of the risks involved [AMA Code of 
Ethics, s.E-2.12]. However, physicians are not obligated to perform the service if they 
lack the skills or knowledge or have a conscientious objection, as long as they engage in 
discussion with the patient or offer a referral. Where a physicians feels that he or she 
lacks the necessary skills or competence to perform a genetic test, it is appropriate to 
offer referral elsewhere, such as to a clinical laboratory [Grody et al., 2001]. Where a 
physician has a conscientious objection to genetic testing or abortion, physicians must at 
least alert the parents of a potential problem, presumably using the risk factors as 
guidelines, so that the parents may seek genetic counseling elsewhere [AMA Code of 
Ethics, s.E-2.12]. Canadian guidelines also explicitly recognize the duty to offer referral 
to an alternative provider when the opportunity for a full and frank discussion is 
constrained. “Failure to discuss all options with women at risk or, alternatively, to refer 
them further, is unethical” [SOGC, 1998].  
 
In conjunction with the ethical duty to make testing available, the courts have recognized 
that there is a legal duty to offer tests from which patients might benefit [Andrews and 
Zuiker, 2003]. The above-noted clinical utility guidelines have come up in some cases. 
For example, a physician may be liable for failure to warn of increased risks due to 
advanced maternal age [Becker v. Schwartz, 1978], failure to sufficiently take into 
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account ethnic background as a risk factor [Naccash v. Burger, 1982], failure to diagnose 
a condition in a previous child that would have provided genetic information relevant to a 
second child [Schroeder v. Perkel, 1981], and failure to offer testing when there is a 
known family history [Philips v. U.S., 1981] or a previous child born with a genetic 
disorder [Keel v. Banach, 1993]. Claims in the context of prenatal testing normally arise 
under “wrongful birth” and “wrongful life” litigation, discussed in detail below, so the 
outcome of such cases will depend on the particular facts of each case and the extent to 
which it fits within the framework of these causes of action. The threat of legal action can 
have a significant impact on the physician-patient relationship. Physicians who practice 
in states that recognize wrongful life and wrongful birth actions are more likely to offer 
prenatal testing [Roop, 2000]. The threat of malpractice litigation is a daunting prospect 
for many health care providers, who may feel the need to practice defensive medicine 
[Mavroforou et al., 2003]. At the same time, it is important to note that case law should 
not be relied upon as the source for best practice standards, because “case law is 
primarily reactive.” It only “speaks to the minimum standard of professional behaviour” 
and it is likely that the public and medical community will expect an even higher 
standard in practice [Botkin, 2003]. 
 
There remains a question about whether the obligation to offer a test will depend on its 
predictive validity. The majority of cases have dealt with single-gene conditions and 
highly predictive tests, and it may be that a different standard will apply for more 
complex genetic conditions and tests of lower predictive validity [Andrews and Zuiker, 
2003; Simmons v. W. Covina Medical Clinic, 1989]. Such an approach may be 
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shortsighted, given that many patients will value the knowledge obtained from such tests, 
and will want to hold healthcare professionals accountable for not providing such 
information [Andrews and Zuiker, 2003]. 
 
Public Policy Concerns 
 
Recent advances in prenatal diagnosis and assisted reproductive technology [ART] have 
given rise to a number of ethically challenging cases with respect to access rights. While 
healthcare providers can refer to a general standard of care where guidelines exist as to 
clinical risk measurement, there is confusion and debate about the appropriateness of 
offering testing in other cases. Some countries offer specific guidelines on access, but 
others, including the U.S., have few laws governing ethically complex cases. Instead, it is 
often left to clinical judgment [Stern et al., 2003; Adams, 2003].    
 
 Sex Selection 
The issue of whether parents ought to be able to use genetic testing to select their fetus on 
the basis of sex is controversial, and can depend on ethical, cultural and religious 
perspectives. Sex selection can occur through one of three methods: 1) prenatal diagnosis 
of fetal sex, followed by termination of pregnancy if it is the undesired sex; 2) 
preimplantation sex diagnosis followed by selection of an embryo of the desired sex; or 
3) prefertilization techniques such as sperm separation. However, the latter option is of 
relative recent development, and its reliability and safety have not yet been proven 
[Morales et al., 2004].  
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The primary medical indication for sex selection is to identify fetuses or embryos that 
may be afflicted with a sex-linked disorder. While the termination of a fetus continues to 
raise ethical concerns, the use of PGD to prevent transmission of a serious sex-linked 
disorder is widely considered ethically permissible [ASRM Ethics Committee, 1999; 
Morales et al., 2004; Csaba and Papp, 2003]. Sex determination may be the only reliable 
method of identifying sex-linked disorders [Morales et al., 2004].  
 
More ethically problematic cases are those in which prospective parents request sex 
selection for personal or cultural reasons, such as preferring a child of a certain sex or 
desiring a sex-balanced family. These motivations raise a host of concerns, including 
gender bias and discrimination, allocation of scarce medical resources, risk of 
psychological harm to children, and overall impact on the human sex ratio [ASRM Ethics 
Committee, 1999]. Sex selection for family balancing purposes is often distinguished 
from an inherent sex preference. The latter is a particular concern in societies and 
cultures that have historically shown a preference for male over female children, such as 
China and India, where screening techniques, abortion, and infanticide have contributed 
to an imbalanced sex population. While there is no such evidence of sex-preference in 
North America [Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, 1993; 
Steinbock, 2002], there remains a concern that allowing sex selection of the first child 
will reinforce negative attitudes and contribute to sex-discrimination [Morales et al., 
2004]. With respect to family balancing, some have suggested that it is justified as long 
as one or more children are already born, since this would not involve an inherent 
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favouring of one sex over another [Robertson, 2003]. Appropriate standards are difficult 
to tease out in this area, for ethical doctrines can be invoked on both sides of the 
argument. For example, it is argued that modern human rights demand that women not be 
compelled to maintain pregnancies against their will. On the other hand, human rights are 
also invoked as the basis for prohibiting sex selection, which is held to violate the right to 
non-discrimination on the basis of sex [Cook et al., 2001].  
 
Sex selection for non-medical reasons is not officially regulated in the United States, but 
it is prohibited in other countries. For example, in March 2004, the Canadian federal 
government enacted Bill C-6, which provides that: 
5. (1) No person shall knowingly [. . .] 
(e) for the purpose of creating a human being, perform any procedure or 
provide, prescribe or administer any thing that would ensure or increase the 
probability that an embryo will be of a particular sex, or that would identify 
the sex of an in vitro embryo, except to prevent, diagnose or treat a sex-
linked disorder or disease. 
Contravention of this provision carries serious penalties including the possibility of 
imprisonment. Unfortunately, the provision is not as clear as it could be, and leaves 
loopholes for non-medical sex-selection during prenatal fetal diagnosis.  
 
While it unmistakably prohibits sex-selection for non-medical purposes at the in vitro 
embryo stage, it leaves loopholes for non-medical sex-selection during prenatal 
diagnosis. For one thing, the provision refers only to embryos, which are defined under 
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the statute as organisms during the first eight weeks of pregnancy. It appears that 
screening the fetus after eight weeks for the purposes of sex-selection is not expressly 
prohibited. There is also no mention of what happens when sex is determined incidentally 
(for example, during ultrasound for another purpose). Is the doctor either permitted or 
obligated to disclose this information to the patient?  
 
In the U.S., the Ethics Committee of the ASRM released a policy statement discouraging 
the use of PGD for non-medical reasons, given concerns about the burdens and costs it 
imposes [ASRM Ethics Committee, 1999]. The AMA Code of Ethics also censures 
“selection on the basis of non-disease related characteristics” [AMA Code of Ethics, s.E-
2.12]. Several world organizations also discourage sex selection for non-medical reasons 
[Council of Europe, 1996; World Health Organization, 1999; International Bioethics 
Committee of UNESCO, 2003]. Nonetheless, these guidelines are not enforceable as law, 
and there is evidence that a number of clinics are advertising and offering IVF services 
for the purpose of sex selection.   
 
The emergence of preconception selection techniques, which do not involve discarding 
embryos or fetuses, has added a new dimension to the ethical debate. The Ethics 
Committee of the ASRM and others have noted that if pre-fertilization techniques were 
found to be safe and reliable, it may be ethical to use them for family balancing purposes 
[ASRM Ethics Committee, 2001; Robertson, 2001].   
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The sex of a fetus may be determined incidentally to another procedure, such as fetal 
karyotyping, and a parent may or may not wish to be informed of the sex. As will be 
discussed below, women have the right to refuse information, just as they have the right 
to receive it. Therefore, for both legal and ethical reasons, it is best to ask patients in 
advance whether they want the sex to be disclosed, and to allow them to opt not to know 
the sex of an embryo or fetus [Mavroforou et al., 2003; FIGO, 1991]. Conversely, the 
ACOG Committee on Ethics recommends that this information not be withheld from a 
pregnant woman who requests it, given that she has a right to her own medical 
information [Morales et al., 2004]. If a physician is uncomfortable with the possibility of 
indirectly contributing to sex selection, he or she ought to clarify the patient’s goals in 
advance, and explicitly inform patients of any procedures they are not willing to perform 
[Morales et al., 2004].  
 
 Testing for Susceptibility and Late-Onset Conditions 
A further ethical concern is the use of PGD to test for genes that increase one’s 
susceptibility to disease, such as cancer, or late-onset conditions, including Huntington’s 
disease and Alzheimer’s disease. The two situations are somewhat different: late-onset 
conditions have full penetrance and are generally not preventable, while susceptibility 
genes do not have full penetrance and may be amenable to treatment. However, it has 
been argued that the ethical issues are similar in each case, given the substantial, non-
trivial burden imposed by the diseases, which may serve to justify testing [Sermon et al., 
2004; Robertson, 2003]. The discomfort with susceptibility testing relates to the use of 
PGD to summarily discard embryos that are only associated with an increased risk, not 
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certainty, of disease [Genetics and Public Policy Center, 2004]. Concerns about adult-
onset testing include the fact that a child could enjoy years of healthy life, and that a 
treatment or cure may yet be found [Genetics and Public Policy Center, 2004]. Late-onset 
testing also has an additional “ethical twist” in that the prospective parent will themselves 
be a carrier of the disease because the genes are dominant. The shortened life span of the 
parent is a concern because the child may lose the parent while still dependent on them 
[Robertson, 2003; Towner and Loewy, 2002]. However, this may still be an ethically 
justifiable procedure, given that people with disability have no less interest in 
reproduction than others, and that denying services in this case could create a slippery 
slope to other restrictions [Robertson, 2003].  
 
The tests are currently legal in the U.S., subject only to gene patent restrictions 
[Robertson, 2003], but this does not mean that practitioners are obligated to provide the 
service. According to Botkin, the adult onset risk is not sufficient to warrant this type of 
testing as a standard of care [Botkin, 2003]. Some ethical committees feel that it is too 
early to offer a clear opinion on the acceptability of these tests, but an ESHRE Ethics 
Task Force noted that PGD for adult onset conditions is acceptable, in spite of limited 
knowledge about potential therapy in the time gap before onset [Shenfield et al., 2003]. A 
UNESCO committee has suggested that susceptibility testing should be given a low 
priority and restricted to cases of high risk of severe disease [International Bioethics 
Committee of UNESCO, 2003]. The NSGC has urged caution in the use of adult-onset 
testing. Genetic counseling is essential, and must include discussion of psychological and 
social risks and benefits, including the potential for future discrimination and the 
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possibility of disclosing carrier status of other family members. Parents ought to consider 
whether the decision to test should be reserved for their offspring to make upon reaching 
adulthood [NSGC Position Statement, 1995]. 
 
 Selecting for Disability  
A difficult issue arises when a woman or couple, who themselves possess a disability or a 
unique characteristic, wish to have a child with that same characteristic. For example, 
some deaf couples have expressed a desire to use prenatal testing or PGD to select a child 
with deafness. For them, deafness is not considered a disability, but rather a defining 
feature of their cultural identity. Similar cases could arise, including dwarves wishing to 
select a dwarf child, or people with an intellectual disability wishing to select a child with 
the same disability [Savulescu, 2002]. 
 
A deaf lesbian couple attracted much criticism in the U.S. when they attempted to have a 
deaf child by intentionally using a deaf sperm donor [Savulescu, 2002]. One argument 
repeatedly raised is that it was a selfish action on the part of the parents. It is argued that 
intentionally selecting for deafness is not in the best interests of the child, because it 
restricts the child’s future options and thereby threatens her autonomy [Davis, 1997]. 
Even a member of the National Association of the Deaf had trouble understanding the 
couple’s decision because deaf people “don’t have as many choices” [Spriggs, 2002].  
 
On behalf of the parents, it has been argued that deaf people can be considered a minority 
group who merely suffer disadvantage as a result of societal discrimination, not of 
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deafness itself. “In this sense, deafness is strictly analogous to blackness” [Levy, 2002]. 
Second, it is questioned whether a child selected for deafness actually suffers harm as a 
result. She is not worse off than she would have been—as might be the case if the parents 
had refused to allow treatment for a correctable condition—because the alternative is that 
she would never have been born; a different child would have been selected instead. 
Third, there is an argument based on freedom of choice. Although some members of 
society may view deafness, or dwarfism, or intellectual disability in negative terms, these 
value judgments should not be imposed on the couple making the reproductive decision. 
This argument reminds one of the terrors of the Nazi eugenic programme, during which 
couples deemed “unfit” to create the perfect child were forced to undergo sterilization 
[Savulescu, 2002]. Indeed, parental choices will influence most of the important aspects 
of a child’s life—from education, to religion, to social interaction—which in turn form 
the basis for the child’s freedom. It is difficult to draw the line between those parental 
decisions which are the preconditions for the child’s freedom of choice, and those which 
foreclose too many options for the child [Levy, 2002]. 
 
Few ethical guidelines have been established in this area. UNESCO’s International 
Bioethics Committee rejects the use of PGD to purposely select a child with a genetic 
disease, and it includes deafness and dwarfism in its definition of disease. This practice is 
held to be “unethical because it does not take into account the many lifelong and 
irreversible damages that will burden the future person” [International Bioethics 
Committee of UNESCO, 2003]  
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 Potential Stigmatization of Persons with Disabilities 
It is important to recognize that for some, the very practice of PND is problematic and 
raises challenging ethical issues. This means that healthcare providers and patients can 
face conflicting messages about the value and acceptability of these tests. The disability 
rights movement has provided a strong critique of prenatal genetic testing, drawing 
heavily on concerns about its eugenic implications. Parens and Asch provide a useful 
summary of the main arguments. First, it is argued that prenatal testing and selective 
abortion are against public policy because such practices can lead to stigmatization of 
individuals living with disability. In particular, there is a worry that the aim of genetic 
testing is “to eradicate disability and reduce the number of births of genetically disabled 
individuals” [DeVaro, 1998]. This is said to be harmful in the message it sends about the 
worth of a life with disability and for ignoring the rich life experiences and useful 
contributions that disabled individuals can bring to society. In response, proponents of 
prenatal testing object that the purpose of the procedure is not to eradicate disability, but 
rather to increase the reproductive autonomy of women. Also, prenatal testing does not 
necessarily entail termination of the fetus; it can provide other useful information and 
allow for interventions [Chen and Schiffman, 2000; Mahowald, 2003]. However, in 
practice there is clearly a tension between the goals of enhancing reproductive choice and 
preventing disability, particularly given evidence that the success of some genetic 
screening programs is measured in terms of reduction in disability [Parens and Asch, 
2003; Beaudet, 1990], and that some women perceive pressure from the social system 
and health professionals to undergo testing and to terminate for disability [Fox, 2002; 
Mahowald, 2003]. Second, there is a concern that the “selective mentality” of prenatal 
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testing, in which parents strive for perfection and lament over disability, fosters a morally 
deficient view of parenthood [Parens and Asch, 2003]. On the other hand, a distinction 
can be drawn between parental motivations during prenatal testing of a “potential child” 
and parental care for a disabled newborn [Mahowald, 2003]. Third, disability rights 
advocates argue that genetic testing is based on a misunderstanding about what life is like 
for individuals living with disability. While it is true that some families experience stress 
and disruption, on average the needs of families with and without disability can be 
“strikingly similar” [Parens and Asch, 2003]. 
 
Some suggest that the practice of selective abortion for disability can be criticized on 
similar grounds as sex selection. Wolbring notes, for example, that both practices raise 
concerns about “significant threats to the well-being of children, the children’s sense of 
self-worth, and the attitude of unconditional acceptance of a new child by parents.” 
Moreover, concerns about stereotypes, discrimination and oppression of persons of the 
unwanted sex can apply equally to stereotypes, discrimination and oppression of 
individuals with the unwanted disability [Wolbring, 2003; Wong, 2002]. According to 
Wolbring, the only way to justify disability deselection, while at the same time 
prohibiting sex-selection, is by “arbitrarily” labeling disabilities and diseases as medical 
problems, thereby applying a different moral standard to them. He suggests that this 
approach is buttressed by the marginalization of people with disabilities and the 
corresponding exclusion of disability rights critiques from the bioethics discourse 
[Wolbring, 2003]. It is therefore important to take seriously the disability rights critique 
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so as to prevent a purely medical model of genetic testing from standing in for a rights-
oriented model. 
 
Where Do We Draw the Line? 
Parens and Asch set up a working group to compare and contrast the disability rights 
critique and the advocacy of prenatal genetic testing and to offer recommendations. 
Although the group reached consensus on a number of issues, they reached an impasse at 
the critical question: “is there a helpful and rational way to distinguish between tests that 
providers should routinely offer and those they should not?” According to the group, it 
comes down to whether a test is judged reasonable or unreasonable under the 
circumstances, and such line-drawing can be an impossible task [Parens and Asch, 2003; 
International Bioethics Committee of UNESCO, 2003]. It is highly dependent on 
individual ethical judgment [Garel et al., 2002]. However, many members of society 
would value some kind of line-drawing, whether for ethical reasons [Henn, 2000] or to 
limit malpractice liability among the medical profession [Botkin, 2003]. Disability groups 
also fear that a lack of guidelines will encourage more testing, and potentially greater 
intolerance of disability [Parens and Asch, 2003; Wasserman, 2003]. Accordingly, there 
have been some attempts to draw workable lines between tests or conditions [Murray, 
1996; Strong, 1997; Botkin, 2003; Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, 1993]. For 
example, Botkin draws a line between childhood conditions that have significantly 
adverse effects on the parents (“in terms of heartache, worry, time, effort, and money”) 
and those that do not. Taking a cue from tort law, he suggests that the magnitude of the 
potential challenge in raising the disabled child can be one criterion for offering prenatal 
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diagnostic testing [Botkin, 2003]. However, the definition of precisely what constitutes a 
serious parental challenge, and any other potential considerations, will need to be fleshed 
out with further ethical guidelines.  
 
Abortion Law 
 
A discussion of prenatal diagnosis would not be complete without a discussion of the 
legal framework governing access to abortion. Until 1988, abortion was regulated as a 
criminal act in Canada. The Criminal Code established a set of rules pursuant to which 
women could have limited access to therapeutic abortions in Canada. It provided that an 
abortion could only be performed by a qualified physician in a hospital accredited by the 
provincial government. In addition, a therapeutic abortion committee had to certify that 
continuing the pregnancy would or would likely endanger the patient’s life or health. The 
committee was to be composed of three additional physicians from the hospital in which 
the procedure was to be performed. Abortions that did not meet these criteria carried the 
possibility of life imprisonment for the physician and 2 years’ imprisonment for the 
female patient [s. 251].  
 
However, in 1988, following a constitutional challenge, the Supreme Court of Canada 
struck down section 251 of the Criminal Code, stating that it violated the right to security 
of the person as guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms because of 
the procedural defects its application entailed. One Supreme Court judge also concluded 
that s. 251 violated women’s freedom of conscience and religion, as well as their right to 
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liberty [R. v. Morgentaler, 1988]. The Court did not conclude that abortion could not be 
criminalised nor that women had a positive right to access abortion services; these issues 
remained open. In 1990, the federal government attempted to pass a bill that would have 
re-criminalised abortion, but this effort was defeated in the Senate in 1991 [Bill C-43]. 
Subsequent federal governments have not attempted to legislate abortion since then. 
Consequently, abortion is not a crime in Canada if it is performed by a qualified medical 
practitioner, with the consent of the woman undergoing the procedure [Rodgers, 2002]. 
 
This does not mean, however, that abortion is completely unregulated. On the contrary, it 
is regulated in the same complex manner as all other medical procedures and therefore 
subject to provincial and territorial laws governing health care professionals, hospitals 
and access to health care services [Rodgers, 2002; Farid, 1997]. The provinces and 
territories have adopted different approaches to the issue of abortion, leading to unequal 
access to these services across Canada.  
 
For example, the funding of abortion services varies among provinces and territories. 
Provincial health insurance plans in British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario and 
Newfoundland and Labrador cover the full cost of abortions performed in both hospitals 
and clinics. Those in Saskatchewan, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island 
and the territories fund only abortions performed in hospitals. Québec and Nova Scotia 
provide full funding for abortions performed in hospitals, but partial funding only for 
those performed in clinics [Childbirth by Choice, 2003]. 
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While some provinces such as British Columbia and Ontario have taken steps to protect 
women’s right to access abortion services without undue interference [Access to 
Abortion services Act; R. v. Lewis; Ontario (A.G.) v. Dieleman], in other jurisdictions 
legislatures have limited access by imposing funding criteria such as the requirement to 
obtain certification by a committee of physicians that the abortion is necessary because 
the health of the woman and/or foetus is at risk [Health Services Payment Regulation; 
Morgentaler v. Prince Edward Island (Minister of Health and Social Services), 1995; 
Moulton, 2003].  
 
Access to abortion services is also hampered by the lack of availability of services. In 
2003, only 17.8 percent of hospitals in Canada were providing abortion services 
[Canadian Abortion Rights Action League, 2003]. Abortion clinics provide services to a 
significant number of women, but they are not found in every province or in the 
territories. Abortion services, whether in hospitals or clinics, are concentrated in large 
urban centres, leaving many regions under-serviced. In addition, abortions are not 
performed at all in Prince Edward Island or in Nunavut [Childbirth by Choice, 2003]. In 
many jurisdictions, this lack of services results in long waiting lists and compels women 
to travel to another region or province to obtain an abortion [Childbirth by Choice, 2003]. 
This may constitute a significant barrier to access given the costs of travel as well as the 
delay involved.  
 
This has serious implications for couples who wish to terminate a pregnancy after the 
prenatal diagnosis of a genetic disorder. Moreover, in many regions of Canada, abortions 
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are performed only up to 12 or 16 weeks’ gestation. Though some hospitals do perform 
abortions after 20 weeks in cases of severe disability or risk to the woman’s life or health, 
these are limited in number [Childbirth by Choice, 2003]. The delay required to conduct 
prenatal testing and obtain results combined with the waiting list for abortion services 
may significantly limit the woman’s or couple’s choices.  
 
Since the landmark case of Roe v. Wade, women in the United States have a 
constitutional right to abortion. In that case, the United States Supreme Court held that 
the right to privacy included the right to decide to have an abortion. However, this latter 
right was not absolute; it could be limited by a compelling state interest. The Court went 
on to devise a rule aiming to balance a woman’s right to privacy with the state’s interest 
in protecting her health and its interest in the potentiality of human life. The result was a 
rule based on a recognition of increasing state interest as the pregnancy progressed. 
During the first trimester of pregnancy, the woman’s right to privacy was prevalent and 
the decision to abort was left to the medical judgement of the woman and her physician. 
After the end of the first trimester, the state could regulate abortion “to the extent that the 
regulation reasonably relate[d] to the preservation and protection of maternal health.” 
Finally, after the fetus became viable, the state could limit and even proscribe abortion, 
except where it was necessary to protect the life or health of the mother [Roe v. Wade, 
1973]. 
 
The Roe v. Wade decision did not settle the abortion issue in the United States. On the 
contrary, it opened up a highly polarized debate. States began passing laws restricting 
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access to abortion through a variety of means, including the restriction of funding, the 
imposing of counseling and waiting periods, the requirement of parental consent for 
minors and the prohibition of certain procedures [Green & Ecker, 2004; Hull & Hoffer, 
2001; Peterson, 1996; Partial Birth Abortion Act of 2003; Alan Guttmacher Institute, 
2004b]. Some of these laws have been successfully challenged, though many have been 
upheld by the Supreme Court. The Court has somewhat eroded the Roe decision through 
its subsequent rulings, but its central finding - that a woman has a right to choose 
abortion before the fetus becomes viable - still holds [Peterson, 1996]. States are 
therefore free to prohibit all late-term or post-viability abortions, except where the 
woman’s life or health is in danger. Nineteen states have adopted such statutes and 
seventeen others have adopted statutes that do not meet the Supreme Court’s criteria 
because they permit abortion only where there is a threat to the life of the woman or 
because they prohibit abortion after a specific gestational age [Alan Guttmacher Institute, 
2004a]. The problem in the context of prenatal genetic diagnosis is that almost all these 
states do not recognize an exception in cases of fetal anomaly. Because of the gestational 
age at which genetic tests can be safely and effectively conducted and the time required 
to obtain results, some women may be placed in a situation where their state laws prohibit 
them from choosing to terminate their pregnancy. This situation may become 
increasingly common as technology enables the medical profession to push the fetal 
viability limit earlier in the gestation period. 
 
A number of additional barriers limit women’s access to abortion in the United States 
[Henshaw & Finer, 2003]. The first of these is financial: many states do not provide any 
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public funding for abortions [Peterson, 1996]. Women or couples who do not have 
private health insurance therefore have to pay for the procedure themselves. Secondly, 
the number of physicians who provide abortion services is limited. The violence of some 
elements of the anti-abortion movement in the 1990s and the lack of training in medical 
schools has had a significant impact on the shortage of providers. In many regions, 
women may have to travel more than 50 or 100 miles to find a physician or a clinic [Finer 
& Heanshaw, 2003; Henshaw & Finer, 2003; Joffe, 2003; Peterson, 1996; Dresser, 1994]. 
This, compounded with legal barriers such as the obligation imposed on physicians to 
provide counseling and to require patients to wait 24 hours before the procedure, or 
alternatively, to evaluate fetal viability, creates a substantial burden for patients who 
already are in a difficult situation [Henshaw & Finer, 2003].         
 
Informed Consent and Genetic Counseling 
 
As discussed in Chapter ___, health care professionals have both a legal and ethical 
duty to ensure informed consent before providing treatment. In the context of PND and 
PGD, informed consent recognizes a woman’s right to reproductive autonomy, which 
means both that women have the freedom to choose whether to procreate or not procreate 
[Strong, 2003], and that they have the right to refuse medically indicated testing [Morales 
et al., 2004]. Reproductive autonomy is promoted when women or couples are provided 
information relevant to decisions about whether to continue the pregnancy [Strong, 
2003]. The duty demands a full disclosure of information to the patient, including 
available tests, alternatives, risks and benefits, and outcomes.  
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Ethical guidelines recognize the importance of ensuring informed consent to prenatal 
testing [ACOG Code of Ethics, s.I(5); NSGC Position Statement, 1991; NSGC Code of 
Ethics, s.II(3); AMA Code of Ethics, s.E-2.12]. For example, the ACOG Code of Ethics 
requires obstetrician-gynecologists to disclose all relevant medical facts, including 
“alternative modes of treatment and the objectives, risks, benefits, possible 
complications, and anticipated results of such treatment” [ACOG Code of Ethics, s.I(5)]. 
The ACOG also recognizes that informed consent implies not only provision of 
information, but also free choice and active decision-making on the part of the patient; it 
is “not only a ‘permitting’ but a ‘doing’” [Morales et al., 2004]. Where patients are 
referred to a clinical laboratory, the responsibility for obtaining informed consent remains 
with the health professional, though laboratories may be required to document the 
consent depending on jurisdiction. In turn, laboratories must provide sufficient 
information to doctors to facilitate the informed consent process [Bradley et al., 2004; 
Richards et al., 2002; Holtzman and Watson, 1997].   
  
Courts have also noted the importance of providing information relevant to reproductive 
decisions. As one court noted, “society has a vested interest in reducing and preventing 
birth defects,” and the failure to perform a procedure “which would have yielded 
information material to the parents’ decision whether to abort the fetus, constitutes a 
breach of . . . duty” [Blake v. Cruz, 1984]. Therefore, healthcare providers are under an 
obligation to provide information, and can face legal liability for failure to enter a full 
discussion with the patient. Indeed it has been noted that most medical malpractice suits 
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are based on inadequate communication between healthcare provider and patient, rather 
than error [Mavroforou et al., 2003]. In the context of prenatal care, the legal duty to 
provide information has been well-established in “wrongful birth” cases, in which the 
parents allege that the physician’s negligence deprived them of the opportunity to make a 
reproductive choice regarding conception or termination.  
 
New and difficult questions about informed consent arise in the context of PND and 
PGD. Prenatal diagnosis is an evolving and complex procedure, characterized by 
“inevitable ambiguity, uncertainty, and difficult decision making,” and involving many 
ethical dilemmas, social implications, and grave potential for diagnostic errors that are 
not seen in other kinds of medical intervention [Strauss, 2002]. Perhaps the most unique 
aspect of genetic testing is that the desirability of treatment depends highly upon moral 
and ethical judgments; in other words, “there is no single “right” answer for all women 
and couples, only answers that are right for the individual woman or couples, based on 
personal circumstances and values” [Royal Commission on New Reproductive 
Technologies, 1993]. Respect for an individual or couple’s values and beliefs is of 
“paramount importance” [Holtzman and Watson, 1997]. This may give rise to unique 
legal and ethical models of informed consent. For example, while Canadian courts 
typically rely on what a “reasonable” patient or physician would decide, it has been 
argued that a “genetics model of informed consent” has evolved which is more about 
incorporating the decision-maker’s (i.e. the patient’s) personal values into the process of 
decision-making [Sharpe, 1997].  
 
The recognition of differing value judgments forms the basis of the principle of non-
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directiveness, which is central to genetic counseling. According to this principle, the role 
of the health professional is:  
. . . not to lead clients to make particular decisions or choices (those 
preferred or recommended by the clinician, the health service or by 
society) but to help them to make the best decisions for themselves and 
their families as judged from their own perspectives [Clark, 1997]. 
The AMA Code of Ethics notes that counselors should not substitute their own personal 
values and moral judgment for that of the prospective parent [AMA Code of Ethics, s.E-
2.12]. It must be remembered that not all women are the same, and that a woman and her 
physician may have radically different perceptions of risk and burden [Csaba and Papp, 
2003]. The counselor or physician should therefore ascertain the patient’s personal values 
and expectations and use them as the framework for the decision-making process. Several 
reasons for the emphasis on non-directiveness have been identified, including: respect for 
individual autonomy; a desire to disassociate current genetic practices from the history of 
eugenics; prevention of over-involvement by health care providers; and protecting 
professionals from legal action for medical decisions [Williams et al., 2002]. However, as 
will be discussed below, there are questions about whether non-directive counseling is 
possible, or even desirable, in practice.  
 
Barriers to Informed Consent in the PND Context 
 
Before delving into the requirements for informed consent, it is important to examine the 
unique barriers to informed consent that arise in the context of prenatal diagnosis. Several 
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studies have unfortunately revealed that many women are not given the tools to exercise 
an informed choice [Marteau and Dormandy, 2001; Kohut et al., 2002], which no doubt 
reflects the extent to which health care providers and patients are struggling to grapple 
with some of these barriers. First, this area of medicine is highly complex, involving a 
variety of different screens and tests and a multitude of detectable anomalies. The general 
public may lack knowledge of the intricate science of genetics [Lanie et al., 2004]. Also, 
given that prenatal testing involves probabilities instead of certainties, patients can feel 
frustrated by the ambiguity and vagueness of the genetic predictions when attempting to 
make an informed decision [Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, 
1993]. Discussions of prenatal diagnosis will be unique from other types of medical 
discussions because many prospective parents will have no first-hand knowledge of the 
disorders being diagnosed. They will therefore be “almost entirely dependent on their 
counselors for information about disabilities and may have difficulty imagining the 
various possibilities and options” [Royal Commission on New Reproductive 
Technologies, 1993]. There is also a danger that health professionals themselves may 
lack sufficient knowledge, especially as services are increasingly performed by primary 
care physicians or obstetricians, rather than geneticists [Ormond et al., 2003; Marteau and 
Dormandy, 2001; Abramsky et al., 2001; Holtzman and Watson, 1997]. Furthermore, the 
rapid increase in technology means that an increasing amount of information is available 
for disclosure. This raises concerns about the detrimental impact of information overload 
on a patient’s ability to understand the process and to make an informed choice.  
 
A second barrier to informed consent is the significant time constraints imposed by the 
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PND context. Not only does the woman or couple face time pressures while trying to 
process information, but the health care provider may also lack the time to present 
information adequately [Marteau and Dormandy, 2001; Holtzman and Watson, 1997]. 
These time pressures become increasingly important when the woman wishes to consider 
abortion, because the longer an abortion is delayed, the more risks and trauma it involves 
for the woman [Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, 1993].  
 
Informed Consent for PND: What to Include in the Discussion 
 
It is essential to remember that prenatal tests are only offered to women and couples. 
They are not mandatory, and the choice to undergo testing remains with the woman 
[Kohut et al., 2002]. It is therefore essential that as much information as possible be 
discussed prior to testing, not merely after a diagnosis has been made. It may also be 
prudent to discuss the genetic counseling service itself, including issues such as 
confidentiality and nonpaternity, given that many patients will be unfamiliar with the 
service [Jacobson et al., 2001]. Several elements have been repeatedly identified as 
central to a well-informed decision with respect to PND.  
 
 I.  Information about the Procedures 
Under Canadian law, courts tend to impose a very high standard of disclosure for services 
that affect reproductive capacity because they are generally not life or death situations 
[Sneiderman et al., 2003]. Ethical guidelines similarly demand a very comprehensive 
disclosure of information. The necessary information includes: available methods of 
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prenatal diagnosis; the difference between screening (e.g. ultrasound) and diagnostic 
testing (e.g. amniocentesis); risks and benefits of various techniques, including the risk of 
pregnancy loss; the timing of the procedures; details of the conditions for which 
procedures screen or test; frequency of abnormal results; accuracy of results, including 
the implications of false positives and false negatives in screening; the frequency of need 
for repeat testing; the possibility that abnormalities may go undetected; and, for relatively 
new and untested procedures, a detailed explanation of their uncertainty and experimental 
nature [SOGC, 1998; Chodirker at al., 2001b]. Overall, there has been a trend towards 
providing an increasing amount of detailed information, and it has been suggested that 
this is unlikely to reverse in the future [Mavroforou et al., 2003]. 
 
The method of presentation of such complex information can have a significant impact 
on the patient’s reaction and interpretation. Describing every possible risk and 
consequence in alarming detail can distort the patient’s comprehension and impair the 
informed consent process. 
It is possible to be frank, honest, and direct without being either grim or 
frightening. It is possible to discuss risk and still leave hope. Pessimism 
may decrease the effectiveness of the communication and lead to 
increased patient anxiety [Kelly, 1992].   
 
It is unclear whether physicians are under a duty to provide information about procedures 
that appear unavailable to the woman. It has been suggested that physicians may now be 
obliged to inform patients of the inadequacies of the health-care system and of the 
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availability of better diagnostic or treatment options elsewhere in Canada or in the United 
States [Osborne, 2003]. Certainly, if the procedure is unavailable due to lack of hospital 
resources, then the patient should be informed if it is accessible elsewhere. But if the 
procedure is unavailable because the cost is too prohibitive or because it is only available 
in distant countries, “it is not obvious that physicians are legally bound to tantalize” the 
woman with options beyond her reach [Dickens, 2002]. There is also authority from the 
U.S. for the argument that physicians are not obligated to inform of procedures available 
in other jurisdictions when such procedures are illegal in the state in question [Spencer v. 
??]. There may also be no duty to disclose treatment that is not generally recommended 
[Munro v. Regent of the University of California, 1989] The physician may want to cater 
the information to options that are within patients’ reasonable access. On the other hand, 
one may want to risk erring on the side of over-informing rather than under-informing 
because the couple may be willing to make sacrifices the doctor does not consider 
reasonable or possible [Cook et al., 2001], and doctors may face liability for failing to 
inform of alternatives that the patient would have considered.  
 
The distinction between prenatal screening and diagnostic testing is a particularly 
important piece of information that must not be neglected. The increasing “routinization” 
of ultrasound screening means that it is occurring with greater regularity than diagnostic 
testing and is more likely to be performed by a general practitioner or obstetrician than a 
genetic specialist [Suter, 2002]. Unfortunately, studies have documented the poor levels 
of information conveyed by non-genetic specialists at early stages of pregnancy 
[Bernhardt et al., 1998; Marteau et al., 1992]. It is essential that women be given the 
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opportunity to opt out, without detriment to their further prenatal care [Mavroforou et al., 
2003]. Particular attention must be paid to the woman’s potential lack of information 
about these screening procedures. First, many women are not aware of the full extent of 
genetic information that can be revealed, and some are not even aware that ultrasound 
can detect fetal abnormalities at all [Kohut et al., 2002]. Women must be properly 
informed of this possibility because some may elect not to have the procedure for this 
reason, or they could at least be better prepared to hear the results. If the woman is not 
properly informed, and a genetic problem is detected, there is a question about whether 
this should be disclosed. This is a difficult ethical issue, and the best recommendation is 
that patients be warned of such possibilities prior to testing so that they can express their 
wishes with respect to disclosure [Ontario Law Reform Commission, 1996]. Second, 
patients must be fully informed about the limitations of the screening procedure (the fact 
that not all anomalies can be detected), and about the risks and benefits involved 
[Driscoll, 2004; SOGC, 1999; Kohut et al., 2002]. Third, while diagnostic testing can 
detect the presence of a disability, screening only identifies at-risk individuals. Patients 
should be informed that a screening test is not a replacement for a diagnostic test, and 
that detection of a fetal abnormality through screening may necessitate a more invasive 
diagnostic test [Driscoll, 2004]. Otherwise, women who would not choose diagnostic 
testing will end up facing a very difficult decision after receiving an abnormal screening 
result.  If they reject the further diagnostic test, “the rest of the pregnancy will be fraught 
with tension, anxiety and worry.” This unnecessary anxiety could have been avoided by 
refusing the initial screening test [Suter, 2002]. Fourth, it is important to clarify the 
distinction between probabilities revealed through screening (including the risks of false 
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positives) and confirmatory diagnoses. To enhance understanding of the numbers, 
evidence shows that quantifying uncertainty in frequencies rather than probabilities, and 
presenting risks in words rather than numbers is most helpful [Marteau and Dormandy, 
2001]. Finally, even women who fully understand this information may face increased 
anxiety upon a false positive screening result, feeling that “something must be wrong,” 
and it is recommended that this risk of anxiety be discussed [Suter, 2002].  
 
 II. Information about the Genetic Conditions 
It is essential to provide women information not only about the available procedures, but 
also about the conditions that can be detected through testing. First, many patients may 
not have sufficient understanding of basic genetics, and it is important to clear up 
misconceptions (e.g. heredity, genetic terminology) [Lanie et al., 2004]. Second, it is 
important to be as comprehensive as possible about the types of conditions that may be 
detected to enable an informed choice about whether they want the information disclosed. 
It must be remembered that although women are entitled to receive information, this does 
not mean they are under a duty to do so; in other words, they have the “right not to 
know.” This is significant in the genetic context because a genetic diagnosis may reveal 
unwelcome information [Dickens, 2002]. Providing fetal information to a parent who did 
not request it may cause a number of harms, including forcing the couple to make 
difficult choices about continuing the pregnancy, changing the parents’ attitude towards 
the pregnancy and the “abnormal” child, and affecting others in the family by revealing 
genetic information about their own health [Boyle et al., 2003]. As one woman recently 
stated, “Knowing is not always best” [Kohut et al., 2002]. It is therefore essential to 
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inform patients about the various anomalies that a procedure may detect, to give them an 
opportunity to a) accept or reject the procedure as a whole, and b) choose which 
information they would like disclosed to them should anything be detected [Boyle et al., 
2003; FIGO, 1991]. Physicians should also be cautious about attributing a woman’s 
reluctance to discuss fetal anomalies to an informed choice not to know. The reluctance 
may simply stem from a fear of the unknown, and physicians should attempt to allay this 
fear [Kohut et al., 2002]. Unfortunately, the breadth of information available means that 
some information will be conveyed more often than others. For example, it has been 
found that women are informed less often about the possibility of detecting a SCA, than 
the possibility of autosomal trisomies, leading to fear and confusion when SCAs are 
detected [Petrucelli et al., 1998].  
 
Providing information about conditions is a difficult balancing act. On the one 
hand, respect for a patient’s autonomy demands that counselors convey as much 
information as is practical to convey, but on the other hand too much information 
might be confusing or overwhelming for the patient. Because genetic information 
is framed in language of probabilities and statistics, practitioners must be 
especially careful not to be misleading and to communicate at a level appropriate 
to the patient.  
  
 III. Range of Options Available upon Finding an Abnormal Result 
Couples must be informed of the full range of management options available when 
confronted with an abnormal result. These options include termination of the affected 
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pregnancy or continuing with the pregnancy while preparing for the birth of the child. 
[Chodirker et al., 2001b; Strong, 2003]. Studies have shown that information on the first 
option is given more often than information on the second option, but even that is not 
always provided [Marteau and Dormandy, 2001].  
 
With respect to abortion, the woman must be informed of the various abortion procedures 
and their availability, including the time frame during which abortion is legally available, 
its availability in the local area, and the nearest facilities where it can be obtained 
[Strong, 2003; Chodirker et al., 2001b]. If a physician has a conscientious objection to 
abortion, or lacks the necessary resources to perform abortions, this does not justify 
failing to inform the patient of the option or failing to offer a referral [Strong, 2003; 
Dickens, 2002; CMA Code of Ethics, AMA Code of Ethics s.E-2.12; FIGO, 1995]. 
 
Although abortion is to be discussed as an option, women must be advised beforehand 
that an agreement to terminate a pregnancy if an abnormality is found is not a 
precondition for testing [Chodirker et al., 2001b; SOGC, 1998; FIGO, 1991]. In other 
words, “the link between prenatal diagnosis of fetal anomaly and termination of 
pregnancy is potential only” [Bennett, 2001]. This is important because studies show that 
a decision to undergo prenatal testing is not always linked to the intention to terminate 
pregnancy [Lafayette et al., 1999]. On the other hand, prenatal testing may not be 
valuable for all women would who not consider an abortion. Counselors should help 
women avoid the “potentially ‘toxic’ knowledge” of a fetal anomaly by encouraging 
them to consider whether abortion is a viable option and what prenatal diagnosis would 
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mean to them [Suter, 2002].   
 
 IV: Social Aspects of Disability and Raising a Disabled Child: Stigma, Prejudice, 
Access to Resources 
It is also important to discuss social issues related to disability, including the long-term 
implications of living with a disease, the prognosis for the disease, and the expected 
quality of the child’s life [Brookes, 2001; Royal Commission on New Reproductive 
Technologies, 1993]. It can also be helpful to describe what the child might look like 
[Petrucelli et al., 1998]. Unfortunately, health care providers are educated too rarely on 
the implications of life with disability, and may have difficulty conveying such 
information [Parens and Asch, 2003]. Different healthcare professionals may also assess 
quality of life in different ways. There is evidence that most health care trainees focus on 
medical aspects of quality of life, instead of personal and social variables. Genetic 
counselling students are more likely than other medical students to prioritize the personal 
and social factors in discussions of quality of life [Ormond et al., 2003]. The perceived 
seriousness of disability and the negative social predictions can also vary depending on 
the person [Marteau and Dormandy, 2001]. This may stem from lack of knowledge and 
experience in dealing with disability. One mother noted that, “without her experience of 
caring for a child with a genetic condition, the negative picture presented by her medical 
practitioners in a later pregnancy would have undermined her confidence in her ability to 
care” [Brookes, 2001]. It is therefore important for health care professionals to receive 
education and training in order to present an accurate picture of disability. This will 
necessarily involve sensitivity training and consultation with a variety of groups to 
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achieve a balanced picture of life with disability [Ormond et al., 2003; Marteau and 
Dormandy, 2001; Parens and Asch, 2003].  
 
Parens and Asch note that there is some uncertainty about the ideal moment to engage in 
this discussion. Prior to the screening test, it may be impractical to convey that much 
information; after a positive screen, parents may be in shock and may feel threatened by 
such a discussion. Parents might be most willing to gather information after a positive 
diagnosis, while on the other hand it may be too stressful to process new information at 
that point. One clear guideline is that if a woman or couple requests information, they 
should receive it [Parens and Asch, 2003].   
 
 V. Social Pressures to Make the “Right” Decision  
Informed choice is threatened by various social pressures that influence a woman or 
couple’s decision in the context of prenatal testing. The very existence of PND makes it 
possible to view the birth of a disabled child as a woman or couple’s “choice,” thereby 
making the woman or couple accountable in the event of discriminatory reactions 
towards the child and themselves [Brookes, 2001]. Social pressures stem not only from 
direct stigmatization, but also from the lack of economic or social resources for those 
living with disabilities. It has been recommended that anyone undergoing genetic 
counseling should be fully informed about the social pressures they may experience, “so 
that they have an opportunity to consider how such pressures might affect them” [Royal 
Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, 1993]. 
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At the same time, however, such pressures can originate in the medical community itself. 
In contrast with the principle of non-directiveness, studies have found that mothers 
experience a need to “push against” both overt and covert pressure to undergo invasive 
PND [Brookes, 2001], and that some are left with the impression that they were not 
actually given a choice [Kohut et al., 2002]. These pressures are of particular danger 
when procedures such as ultrasound are offered in a routine “matter of fact” manner. 
Thus, women ought to be explicitly informed that they have the right to refuse or accept 
any aspect of the offer [Kohut et al., 2002].  
 
Emotional and Psychosocial Counseling as Part of the Informed Consent Process 
 
Another unique aspect of PND relative to other medical services is that it is not 
concerned with treatment and cure, but rather with probabilities and predictions. Given 
the highly unsatisfactory nature of such information, the anxiety it may cause, and the 
potential for grave errors, an important aspect of prenatal care in the context of PND is 
the provision of emotional support. This is based on the ethical principle of beneficence, 
which requires physicians to reasonably attempt to prevent and remove health-related 
harms to their patients. When the woman requires help, including emotional support, and 
the health professional is in a position to offer it, the professional is under a duty to do so 
[Strong, 2003]. It has been suggested that this type of emotional and psychological 
counseling imposes upon genetic testing a distinct model of care, based upon a 
therapeutic “human vision” rather than a mere “medical vision” [Sharpe, 1997]. Not only 
can emotional distress threaten the patient’s well-being, but it can significantly impair his 
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or her ability to comprehend the information. There may be a duty to assess and respond 
to the patient’s emotional and psychological needs to ensure that the communication 
process is not impaired [Sharpe, 1994b; 1996].   
  
Pre- and Post-Test Counselling 
Before the patient even chooses to undergo testing, counsellors may have a duty to 
inform her of the risk of anxiety subsequent to the test [Suter, 2002]. After testing, it is 
the responsibility of the health care provider who initiates referral to ensure that, when 
test results are received, they are reviewed and reported to the woman as quickly as 
possible [SOGC, 1998]. Because the initial shock of receiving a positive diagnosis may 
cause “psychological devastation,” physicians must respond to the psychological and 
emotional concerns of the parents, inform them of the potential for mistaken diagnosis, 
and inform them of the full range of options available [SOGC, 1999]. Although many 
physicians receive little or no training in giving “bad news” and feel uncomfortable doing 
so, there is a growing body of literature that can be consulted regarding effective 
techniques for delivering “bad news” in these situations [Strong, 2003].  
 
Follow-Up Counseling 
Following the diagnosis of a severe disorder, or the decision to terminate a pregnancy, 
the woman or couple may require additional long-term supportive counseling. Follow up 
calls and letters can be a valuable source of support [Petrucelli et al., 1998]. Women may 
feel a strong sense of guilt following an abortion [Royal Commission on New 
Reproductive Technologies, 1993], and it also marks the beginning of a grieving process 
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for many women [Bennett, 2001; Dallaire and Lortie, 1993]. It is recommended that 
“special attention” be given to the counseling needs of women and couples in cases 
involving termination after the discovery of a serious fetal disorder [Royal Commission 
on New Reproductive Technologies, 1993]. For example, a session should be scheduled 
to counsel the patient concerning future pregnancies and to assess her emotional needs. 
Moreover, the woman and her partner may grieve in different ways, creating a sense of 
isolation from each other, and referral for couple’s counseling may be appropriate 
[Strong, 2003]. Finally, access or referral to self-help groups or associations of people 
who have had a child with the same disorder may help reduce the feeling of isolation and 
provide support and helpful advice [Royal Commission, 1993; Dallaire and Lortie, 1993; 
Petrucelli et al., 1998]. 
 
Structuring the Genetic Counselling Session 
 
The setting of the genetic counseling session plays an important role in the informed 
consent process. First, women and couples must be given sufficient time to consider the 
relative advantages and disadvantages of various procedures [Mavroforou et al., 2003]. 
Canadian guidelines recommend counseling appointments be scheduled at least one day 
prior to invasive procedures [Chodirker et al., 2001b]. Second, face-to-face encounters 
may be the best way to communicate information because they allow the counselor to see 
and respond to the patient’s emotional reactions, to gauge her level of understanding 
based on body language, and to provide helpful visual aids. The physical setting must be 
conducive to a discussion; namely, private and relatively quiet [Strong, 2003]. However, 
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some studies indicate no large difference between telephone and in person counseling 
with respect to patient understanding and anxiety. Indeed, visual privacy of the telephone 
may be beneficial for open communication [Sangha et al., 2003]. In any event, telephone 
discussions can be an important adjunct for women who are geographically distant 
[Chodirker et al., 2001b; Sangha et al., 2003]. Third, as discussed in Chapter ___, 
written brochures or videos should be made available [Holtzman and Watson, 1997], but 
should not be relied on as the sole means of transmitting information. Concerns have 
been raised about the quality of these brochures, and whether they may be too complex, 
technical, or difficult to read [Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, 
1993; Marteau and Dormandy, 2001]. Canadian guidelines note that if provided, they 
must be regularly reviewed and updated [SOGC, 1998]. Written summaries of the 
counseling sessions can also be helpful for the patient [Royal Commission on New 
Reproductive Technologies, 1993], although it has been found that counselors are 
unlikely to use informed consent documents [Jacobson et al., 2001].  
 
Informed Consent and Pre-implantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD) 
 
While genetic counseling for PND has been studied in detail, little has been written about 
the recommended course of action for couples considering PGD, presumably because it is 
relatively new and uncommon procedure [Raeburn, 2001]. In this case, the consultation 
requires discussion of two topics: in vitro fertilization (IVF) and PGD. There must be a 
realistic assessment of pregnancy success, side effects and potential risks. It is also 
important to explain that in PGD only a limited number of diseases are tested for, 
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meaning that the baby is not guaranteed to be “perfect” [Overton et al., 2001]. It has also 
been suggested that couples be informed of the differing misdiagnosis rates depending on 
the implantation method, and that they should decide the degree of misdiagnosis that is 
acceptable. The discussion must also cover the welfare of future children and the needs of 
the family [Raeburn, 2001]. Couples should also receive psychological counseling, 
involving exploration of their reasons for choosing PGD and their overall feelings. 
Couples who choose PGD may already have suffered stresses, such as an affected child, 
repeated miscarriage, previous prenatal diagnosis, or termination [Overton et al., 2001]. 
Finally, the professionals involved at the referring genetic centre and the clinical team 
from the IVF centre should keep in close contact with one another [Raeburn, 2001]. 
 
Final Thoughts: Can Genetic Counselling be Non-Directive? 
 
Although non-directiveness in genetic counselling has come to be seen as a “universal 
norm,” doubts have been raised about how achievable, how desirable, and how accurate 
the principle is in practice [Bower et al., 2002; Anderson, 1999]. A recent survey of 
genetic counsellors revealed some of their main concerns. First, the nondirective 
approach can be confusing for women because they are used to the typical settings in 
which the health practitioner offers an opinion. Second, some patients are actually 
seeking direction from practitioners when making important health decisions, to relieve 
the responsibility from themselves. Third, some women might value the views of others 
as an information-gathering tool, to test different opinions. Fourth, attempting to give 
scientific facts and medical knowledge in a value-neutral way is incompatible with the 
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notion of a caring relationship, and can undermine open communication. The survey 
highlighted that counsellors did not adopt a uniform strategy for discussions, and much 
depended on how they framed the information and what information they opted to 
disclose [Williams et al., 2002].   
 
Aside from the practitioner’s behaviour, the general move towards routine prenatal 
testing has an impact on the directiveness of counselling. Both the strong value our 
society places on knowledge, information, and technology, and the increasingly 
routinized way in which prenatal testing is offered places informed “choice” at risk. In 
particular, these factors deemphasize the emotional and psychological ramifications of 
undergoing such testing [Suter, 2002]. Furthermore, genetic counseling and genetic 
procedures (especially prenatal screening) are now performed by a variety of individuals 
other than genetic counselors, such as obstetricians and midwives. These non-genetic 
health professionals are less “steeped” in the culture of nondirectiveness and may not 
understand that genetic testing imposes a unique standard of care for communication  
[Suter, 2002; Williams et al., 2002; Sharpe, 1994A; 1996]. Evidence does show that the 
counselling provided by geneticists tends to be more positive and less directive than that 
provided by other health professionals [Marteau and Dormandy, 2001].  
 
Confidentiality 
 
Health care professionals have a legal and ethical duty to protect the confidentiality of 
personal health information they receive from or about their patients [AMA Code of 
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Medical Ethics; CMA Code of Ethics; Feinberg, Peters & Willson, 1984; Picard & 
Robertson, 1996; Marshall & Von Tigerstrom, 2003]. What does this entail for health 
care professionals who provide prenatal testing and preimplantation genetic diagnosis 
services? As a general rule, the wishes of patients to keep their information confidential 
should be respected. Couples or women who choose to undergo prenatal testing or 
preimplantation diagnosis may wish to keep this a secret. They may feel that their health 
risks and the risks to their potential children concern only themselves. Alternatively, they 
may worry that their choice to undergo such tests, to consider a termination of pregnancy 
or the elimination of embryos, or to voluntarily have a child who will be disabled could 
be considered morally questionable by others. Parents may also want to keep the results 
of these tests, and the information it reveals about them, to themselves for a number of 
reasons, for example for fear of stigmatization and discrimination or because of feelings 
of guilt. One parent may also oppose the disclosure of prenatal test results to the other 
parent because he or she believes it is in the other’s best interest or because he or she 
fears abandonment. If a child is born with a genetic disorder, parents may prefer to give 
an alternative explanation for the child’s disability.  
 
Nonetheless, this information could be relevant for a number of third parties, including 
relatives of the couple and, in particular, those who are of reproductive age or younger 
(siblings, cousins, nephews and nieces, etc.). Because genetic information is individual 
and familial, a test result indicating that a foetus carries a genetic mutation or 
chromosomal aberration could indicate that blood relatives are at increased risk of having 
a genetic disorder themselves or of having a child with a disorder. The refusal of a patient 
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to share that information creates a dilemma for the healthcare professional; his or her 
duty to protect the patient’s confidentiality collides with his or her duty to prevent harm 
[Lucassen & Parker, 2004; Offit et al., 2004]. Various organisations have developed 
policies and guidelines to assist healthcare professionals to resolve these issues. The 
American Society of Human Genetics adopted the position that genetic information 
“should be protected by the legal and ethical principle of confidentiality” but that 
disclosure should be permitted in exceptional circumstances, namely when (1) attempts 
have been made to encourage a patient to disclose the information but have failed; (2) it 
is highly likely that the non-disclosure of information will lead to a serious and 
foreseeable harm; (3) the at-risk relatives are identifiable; (4) the harm is preventable or 
treatable or medically acceptable standards indicate that early monitoring will reduce the 
genetic risk; and (5) the harm that may result from the failure to disclose outweighs the 
harm that may result from disclosure [American Society of Human Genetics, 1998]. 
Though these criteria are broad, they do provide much needed guidance to healthcare 
professionals who are confronted with these issues. However, healthcare professionals 
should be aware that though a disclosure may be considered ethically justifiable, it may 
not be legally justifiable. In some settings, the non-consensual disclosure of a patient’s 
personal information may be authorised only if it is required by law. 
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